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 1 Abstract 
In this paper we will study the phenomenon of customer–supplier interaction and integration 
from a resource perspective. In economic terms, a fish may be seen as a more or less 
homogeneous resource. If the herring is seen as a homogeneous resource, a market should be 
the best way to handle the selling and buying. However, if the herring is seen as heterogeneous 
resource, a more extensive type of interaction is needed. One interesting aspect with herring is 
that different business actors apparently see this resource in different ways. Thus, we will have 
a mixed situation, creating possible difficulties for the actors involved. 
Our starting point for this study is Germany, one of the most important export markets for 
Norwegian herring. Today, Norwegian legislation hinders the possibility of vertical integration 
and cooperation at the supply side of the network. However, the industry sees opportunities for 
growth and integration on the marketing side. 
To examine this issue, our study uses a qualitative design methodology, incorporating personal 
in-depth interviews with selected respondents in Norway and Germany. Secondary data is also 
used. To analyse the data, we introduce five interaction and integration patterns termed (1) pure 
exchange – no integration, (2) limited interaction and integration, (3) extensive interaction and 
developed integration and (4) indirect interaction and structural integration, and (5) full 
integration. 
Our paper is an investigation of the link between the resource heterogeneity and the patterns of 
customer–supplier integration. Our findings suggest that there is a link between how the actors 
perceive herring as a resource and how they interact with counterparts. We find that the actors 
who see the resource as homogeneous have limited interaction and little or no integration, 
whereas the actors who see the resource as heterogeneous have a much more extensive 
interaction and closer ties. 
The research reported in this study was funded by the Seafood Research Council in Norway 
(FHF). 
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2 Introduction 
The pelagic industry is changing. From a time when pelagic fish was mainly considered a 
standardized raw material, there have been substantial developments in catching, sorting, 
filleting, storing and transporting of pelagic fish. On the marketing side, large international 
actors in processing, manufacturing and retail have contributed to the Norwegian herring 
developing from a basic ‘everyday’ meal to high-end products in demanding markets. 
Norwegian matjes-herring in the Netherlands is a good example here. 
Other changes are occurring concerning the way how pelagic fish is bought and sold. From a 
time when trade was based largely on single transactions, industrial actors are now increasingly 
developing long-term business relationships and have closer cooperation with customers and 
suppliers. 
This development raises an interesting issue concerning how the herring is viewed from a 
resource perspective. Previously, the herring was considered a homogeneous resource in 
economic terms, as it was handled as a standard raw material. Current development indicates 
that more actors are viewing and handling the herring as a heterogeneous resource where 
different features of the fish are combined with other resources. From an economic point of 
view, a homogeneous resource has the same value independent of the other resources it is 
combined with. But the value of a heterogeneous resource is directly affected by how it is 
combined with other resources. 
This apparent difference in how the fish is perceived becomes fundamental in determining what 
kind of economic model should be used to formulate advice and policies. If the herring is seen 
as a homogeneous resource, the market model is very suitable. This model assumes 
homogeneity in the relevant resources which makes it possible to use the market price as a 
market-clearing mechanism. However, if the fish is seen as a heterogeneous resource, the 
industrial network model is more useful, as resource heterogeneity is a fundamental assumption 
in the model – it is considered the basis for interaction. Subsequently, if the actors involved in 
the herring industry are seeking marketing efficiency, improvement and cost savings, the 
recommendations will be quite different given the assumption of the fish’s features. 
The apparent variety in how fish is seen and handled as a resource creates both analytical and 
managerial problems. From a managerial point of view, we have the problem that different 
actors will not expect or understand the behaviour of others. Some actors will behave as if the 
herring is a homogeneous resource, whereas other actors will identify special features of the 
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herring. This may create problems in some relationships and possibilities in others. Some of the 
interaction aims to deal with these problems as there will be a search for counterparts viewing 
the fish, or at least treating the fish, in the same way. Some of the interaction will aim to 
influence the counterparts in changing their perception of the fish in order to influence the acting. 
Our paper is structured in the following way: Introducing the two theoretical building-blocks 
on which we develop our case, we first discuss that resource heterogeneity is closely related to 
the interaction process taking place between the companies. Second, we introduce integration 
as this has been the way relationships between companies have been analysed given that the 
basic resource is homogeneous. Then, we present a categorization of five integration and 
interaction patterns in order to make it possible to analyse an empirical picture where we have 
actors who have different perceptions of the basic resource. We then describe and analyse our 
case in terms of these theoretical components: First, we analyse how differences in resource 
perspectives shape the interaction between the actors involved in the Norwegian and German 
herring industry; then we apply the five patterns to our case; analysing how actors handle 
differences in resource perspectives. Our paper concludes with a discussion of the managerial 
and analytical problems we face when the actors have different perspectives on something as 
fundamental as the resources they share and how they seek to solve these problems. 
3 Theoretical background 
We will look at this phenomenon in terms of the interaction process with a starting point in 
industrial network theory (Håkansson et al., 2009) and in terms of integration with a starting 
point in micro-economic theory. 
3.1 Interaction process and the resource dimension 
There are several theoretical perspectives explaining why it is beneficial for companies to invest 
in long-term customer–supplier relationships. In economic theory, the cost aspect is often 
emphasised; relationships reduce transaction costs between companies (Williamson, 1985). 
Well-established relationships reduce procurement costs because we develop knowledge about 
our suppliers over time (Kumar et al., 1992). Well-established relationships also reduce 
marketing costs as it is easier to sell to existing customers than to repeatedly target new ones. 
Relationships reduce uncertainty because we know our partners. 
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However, in the IMP tradition, relationships can also create revenues (Håkansson et al., 2009). 
According to this approach, the substance of a relationship can be divided into three dimensions 
(Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). The first dimension comprises the resource-ties that 
companies develop and share, such as goods and services, manufacturing facilities, finance, 
technology, knowledge and personnel. The second dimension comprises the activity-links that 
companies perform together, for example storage, logistics, technical development, sales and 
marketing campaigns and purchasing. The third dimension comprises the actors’-bonds 
established between companies in terms of trust vs. distrust, closeness vs. distance, cooperation 
vs. competition, power and conflict. A relationship can be strengthened by working along these 
three dimensions, i.e. by integrating resources and activities and emphasising cooperation, 
openness and trust. The interaction between these three dimensions is the driving force in the 
relationship. 
If we look at the resource dimension, the link between resource heterogeneity and type of 
interaction is an aspect that earlier IMP research has dealt with extensively (Holmen, 2001; 
Håkansson and Snehota, 1995; Håkansson and Waluszewski, 2007; Håkansson and 
Waluszewski, 2002; Håkansson, 1982). In IMP terms, heterogeneity is the basis for interaction. 
For instance, Håkansson and Walusewski (2002) say that ‘…resources used in an industrial 
setting are combined in intricate patterns – which are not necessarily obvious to the actors 
involved’ (p. 31). Further, they say that  
‘[T]he heterogeneity of resources is mainly considered in terms of interactive effects… 
as a resource always has hidden qualities, since there are always new ways to combine 
it with existing resources...By being activated in a new way, an established resource can 
exhibit new features…This also implies that it is impossible for any human being to have 
full knowledge of any resource.’ (p. 32).  
This suggests that the specific features of a resource are not only created by interaction, but also 
dependent upon how actors perceive the resource can be used in combination with other 
resources. Such specific features may be exploited by new activity designs through cooperation 
and interdependence. This becomes more important, the larger the companies are, because the 
total amount of resources becomes greater. In this way relationships develop specific resources, 
where two companies working closely develop resources unique to their relationship (Jahre et 
al, 2006; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Increased cooperation and actor bonds will protect this 
investment because specific resources have little application elsewhere. 
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Subsequently, when actors develop their relationships they become systematically connected. 
For instance, the way in which a company chooses to handle its suppliers has an impact on its 
ability to work with its customers. Indirect relationships are, thereby, an important effect of 
heterogeneity. Relationships are, therefore, part of an extensive, complicated and complex 
network structure where relationships are mutually affected. This perspective challenges the 
view of companies as independent actors. Blois (1998) encompasses this neatly by arguing that 
having business relationships is not a matter of choice for companies. The important choices 
are about which relationships to develop and how to develop them. 
To sum up, the interaction process can be studied in terms of how the resource-ties, activity-
links and actors’-bonds are developed between the actors. Relationships are, by definition, 
highly time-based. As interaction progresses the relationship becomes strengthened, but if the 
parties fail to invest in the relationship, it will eventually dissolve (Dwyer et al., 1987; Ford, 
1980; Ford et al., 2011). 
3.2 Integration structure 
Integration, which can be seen as a specific outcome of the interaction process, has been dealt 
with to a lesser extent in the IMP tradition. Instead, it is rooted in economic theory where it is 
one of the components describing the market structure. For example, in strategic and supply 
chain management literature building on economic theory, integration is commonly seen as a 
‘make or buy’ decision, i.e. to what extent a company can create economies of scale by 
integrating activities and avoiding opportunism, or keeping an activity in-house where a 
company has superior performance (Huemer and Furlan, 2011). In industrial marketing 
literature, integration is defined along an axis where we find perfect competition or market 
solutions at one end of the continuum, and full vertical integration on the other (Webster, 1992). 
In the perfect market, actors have no ties beyond the single transaction. Here the actors seek 
freedom of choice and avoid commitment. At the other extreme is full economic integration 
between the actors or hierarchy in Webster’s terms. In between these two extremes, Webster 
defines five typologies (pure exchange, repeated transactions, long-term relationships, 
partnerships, strategic alliances, network organisations and hierarchies) representing increasing 
degrees of vertical integration. Blois (1972) originally labelled this as quasi-integration, where 
‘it is possible for a firm to develop a relationship with some of its suppliers such that the 
advantages of vertical integration can be obtained without the normally associated 
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disadvantages’ (Blois, 1972, p. 254). The prerequisite for this is that the customer is of 
sufficient size, i.e. represents a significant proportion of the suppliers output. 
There is a rich body of research into quasi-integration, most predominantly in the transaction 
cost analysis (TCA) tradition (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1981). Here, quasi-integration 
‘serves as an alternative governance structure to vertical integration’ (Cai et al., 2009, p. 660). 
Cai et al. (2009) see quasi-integration as a hybrid of governance which protects specific assets, 
adapts to uncertainty and enables efficient transactions. According to the TCA theory, 
governance mechanisms are a question of cost. If we look at empirical observations, we 
definitely see a rich variation in the relationship types. Industrial markets are often represented 
by a limited amount of dominant buyers and sellers. In addition, both parties are active. 
Customers approach suppliers with their needs or requirements, while the seller offers a solution 
to the customer. This leads to repeated transactions which often develop into long-term 
relationships where both parties must adapt and, therefore, become more or less interdependent 
and integrated. This suggests that there is a larger variety in terms of quasi-integration in the 
real world compared to the theoretical model of a perfect market. One way to treat this is in 
terms of market failure arguments, i.e. suggesting that quasi-integration means that the 
conditions for a market solution are not fulfilled. 
However, if we take another step – assuming the existence of heterogeneity in some of the 
relevant resources – this will dramatically change the basic conditions for achieving efficiency 
and the use of quasi-integration. Heterogeneity in important resources means that companies 
will seek to utilise the development potential of their resources. If an actor can utilise the 
heterogeneity potential of its counterparts, his own resources will become more valuable. Thus, 
we will have relationships where both parties make mutual investments. The results might be 
adaptions and increased interdependence where breaking relationships and building new ones 
will be costly and often counterproductive. 
3.3 Interaction and integration depending on resource view 
Subsequently, the apparent differences in resource view will have an impact on both the 
interaction process and integration structure. In Figure 1, we present this as four relationship 
patterns: 
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Resource View Interaction Process 
Integration 
Structure 
 
Homogeneous A: Arm’s length C: None or full integration 
 
Heterogeneous 
B: Varying patterns of 
interaction 
D: Varying patterns of 
integration 
  
Figure 1: Relationship patterns depending on resource type. 
 
When the fish is seen as a homogeneous resource, the recommendation is that the interaction 
should be at an arm’s length distance (A), whereas if the fish is seen as more or less 
heterogeneous, the interaction can vary in both intensity and extent (B). The aim of this 
interaction is to identify and implement better combinations of how other resources are related 
to the fish. If the fish is seen as a homogeneous resource (A), there are no such reasons and the 
interaction becomes a matter of price. 
In terms of integration structure, if the resource is treated as homogeneous, the actors will revert 
to the market model where competition (no integration) or economies of scale (full integration) 
are the key features (C). But if the resource is seen as heterogeneous, there are a number of 
possibilities for the parties to become more or less integrated. We get several different patterns 
of integration (D). 
In our case, we have the interesting situation that some of the actors see the fish as a 
homogeneous resource while others see it as heterogeneous. For a pelagic company, this means 
that it must develop its interaction and integration patterns differently according to how it sees 
the fish and how its counterparts see the fish. 
3.4 Five patterns of interaction and integration 
In reality, we find different types of relationships or linkages, somewhere between the two 
extremes of complete homogeneity and complete heterogeneity. Companies seldom operate 
completely independently of each other, but neither are they highly integrated. Actors always 
have some kind of relationship with other companies, but they will vary in dimension. It is 
between these two extremes we find what we have chosen to call varying patterns of 
interaction/integration. Companies will always seek a certain freedom of choice when it comes 
to which actors they want to enter into relationships with. Some companies will have numerous 
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weaker relationships with a number of counterparts. Other companies will have closer ties with 
only a few actors. What is right for one business may not be right for another – it is the 
company's ability to develop and handle (utilise) their relationships that is crucial. 
This perspective on interaction creates new possibilities for integration: A company might have 
few or no close relationships. Another company may have some close relationships limited to 
one or two partners, but few close relationships beyond this. A third company may handle many 
close relationships. There is, therefore, no ‘natural law’ that determines the number and type of 
relationships the company chooses, but this is rather determined by the company's ability and 
willingness to develop relationships that it considers appropriate. 
In this study, we have found a variation in how different actors relate to their counterparts. This 
applies both to the supply side and the customer side. No actor has found an ‘optimal’ way of 
working, but we have identified a variety of different opportunities for customer–supplier 
relationships to develop, depending on how the actors see the fish as a resource. If we look 
more closely at these different opportunities or relationship types, we see that we can group 
them into some specific categories. On this basis we suggest five interaction/integration patterns: 
(1) pure exchange – no integration, (2) limited interaction and integration, (3) extensive 
interaction and developed integration and (4) indirect interaction and structural integration, and 
(5) full integration. These patterns are mainly derived from our empirical data, but we are also 
draw upon our previous theoretical discussion. 
Here is a description of the five patterns: 
1) Pure exchange – no integration 
This is the case where the actors try to create and sustain pure exchange in the market, thus 
assuming that the fish is a homogeneous resource. Here we will look at deliberate acts and 
attitudes against integration. A policy for multiple suppliers in a tendering process to avoid 
dependence is an example of this pattern. 
2) Limited interaction and integration 
This type of interaction/integration is characterised by a certain degree of cooperation and 
adaptation, which in turn is based on an assumption of some, however less influential, 
heterogeneity. This is more of a random consequence of the cooperative interaction and the 
relationship’s characteristics than an intentional move towards closer integration. An example 
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of this can be regular meetings and updates on deliveries. This type of relationship is directly 
between two parties. 
3) Extensive interaction – developed integration 
This pattern is based on an assumption of heterogeneity, and here we group relationships with 
a greater degree of adaptation between the two companies. Examples of this may be that the 
counterparts have developed manufacturing technology together or have developed common 
storage or transport activities. This type of interaction/integration is direct and requires an active 
attitude, willingness to cooperate and investment in the relationship from both parties. 
 4) Indirect interaction – structural integration 
Here we group relationships where we see an indirect influence of interaction in other 
relationships, i.e. indirect links between the actors that nevertheless have consequences for the 
way they interact. There is a basic heterogeneity where each actor does not have to handle it 
directly in his relationships, but needs to adapt to how other actors handle their relationships. 
For example, production technology developed between two companies have consequences for 
the interaction between other companies when this technology becomes an industry standard. 
5) Full integration 
Here the parties are fully integrated, resembling structures referred to as hierarchy or vertical 
integration in the literature. The parties have become a unit with integrated operations and 
control; they share financial systems as they now are part of the same organisation. Here the 
fish may be seen both as homogeneous (economies of scale) or heterogeneous (strong 
interdependence and adaptations between the parties). 
This is a summary of the interaction/integration patterns and a view of resource heterogeneity 
(Figure 2): 
 
Patterns of interaction and integration 
 
Resource view 
1. Pure exchange – no integration Homogeneity 
2. Limited interaction and integration Partial heterogeneity 
3. Extensive interaction and developed 
integration Heterogeneity 
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4. Indirect interaction – structural 
integration Heterogeneity 
5. Full integration Homogeneity and heterogeneity 
Figure 2: Interaction/integration patterns and view of resource heterogeneity. 
 
Our case analysis in section 5 draws on these building blocks. First, we look at the extent 
differences in resource view shapes interaction between the actors involved. We then apply the 
five patterns to look at how actors handle differences in resource perspectives. 
4 Methodology and case 
4.1 Research sample 
Industrial markets are characterised by a few dominant actors, and this is also the case for the 
pelagic industry. We, therefore, decided upon a qualitative design methodology, primarily 
personal in-depth interviews with key respondents in Norway and Germany. In Norway, the 
pelagic industry has been characterized by several mergers, and today five large actors dominate 
the market, representing 70% of all the pelagic production (see Table 1). These companies 
constitute our Norwegian sample. They purchase, process and export herring to the world 
market. 
Table 1: Norwegian sample and share of herring exports. 
Norwegian Sample Annual Production (tons) 
Brødrene Sperre 22,000 herring 
26,000 mackerel 
Nils Sperre A/S 25,000 herring 
22,000 mackerel 
Egersund Seafood Not stated (around 15% of market share)  
Nergård 110–115,000 herring 
Norway Pelagic Not stated 
 
Germany was chosen as it is one of the main markets for Norwegian herring. German imports 
of herring products (fillets, fresh and frozen) amounted to 150,000 tons in 2011, of which 
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104,000 tons was from Norway (Norwegian Seafood Export Council, 2013). In Germany, we 
have interviewed six large importers, agents and producers. All have direct relationships with 
Norwegian suppliers. Our sample imported 56,000 tons in 2011, which is close to a 50% share 
of the market for imports of Norwegian herring (see Table 2): 
Table 2: German sample and share of herring imports. 
German sample Annual total herring import 
(tons) 
Import from Norway (tons) 
Fokken & Müller Not stated 3,000 
Friedrichs 250–200 Not stated 
Friesenkrone 6,000 3,500 
Hawesta Not stated 16,000 
Homan Not stated 25,000–30,000 
Lübbert Not stated Not stated 
 
To gather information about key relationships between Norwegian suppliers and German 
customers, we developed an interview guide (Appendix A). In particular, we wanted to address 
the following issues: 
a. Identification of the actor’s most important relationships with their counterparts 
and their input and marketing activities 
b. Identification of the actor’s most important internal technical resources 
c. Discussion with the respondents about how they handled the most important 
relationships 
d. Identification of the actor’s connected relationships (their networks). 
In addition to qualitative methods, we have used secondary data from various sources. The 
interviews lasted between one and two hours. They were taped and later transcribed, and the 
transcripts were subsequently coded and analysed using NVivo. 
5 Case presentation and analysis 
 
Our paper deals with two theoretical components: Differences in resource perspectives and 
interaction/integration patterns. This theory also guides our description of the case, and the case 
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analysis thus becomes an integrative part of the empirical presentation material. First, we 
analyse how the different resource perspectives shape interaction between the actors involved, 
and then we apply the five interaction patterns to analyse how the actors handle differences in 
resource perspectives. 
5.1 Case analysis from a resource perspective 
5.1.1 Resource homogeneity and Norwegian suppliers 
From a Norwegian perspective, fish is seen very much as a homogeneous resource and 
Norwegian legislation actively promotes de-integration. A good example of this is the 
Norwegian auctioning system of pelagic fish. Here, all herring must be sold through the 
Norwegian Fishermen’s Sales organisation (NSS) in a closed auction system. Five auctions are 
conducted daily. The auctions take place by fishing boats reporting their catches to the auction 
and buyers bidding on these catches. After the auction has come to an end, the prices are made 
public. Buyers in this case are the production companies, with receiving facilities at different 
locations along the Norwegian coast. In recent years there has been a restructuring of the 
industry, and several receiving facilities have merged or closed. Today there is considerable 
overcapacity on the receiving side. 
‘Much of our focus is still on the catch side because it is extremely important to obtain 
raw materials. Particularly now as the quotas are reduced. We and our competitors 
have adapted to a production capacity which is 300,000 tons above today’s limits. So 
now our focus mainly concerns how to get raw material.’ (Norwegian exporter). 
This particular legislation prevents the Norwegian exporters from forming long-term 
relationships with their foreign customers. The focus of the exporters is to get access to the 
herring, keep their facilities running, and ensure steady supplies to their customers in a back-
to-back situation. One respondent said, ‘We do not buy the goods before we have orders. This 
gives us less risk. But the margin between the auction price and our sales price is reduced.’ 
Meanwhile, Norwegian exporters are facing price pressure from their export customers, who in 
turn are facing price pressure from their customers which are mainly large European retailer 
chains. These buyers usually make annual agreements and cannot change the price in the middle 
of the catch season. One Norwegian respondent said:  
‘Our customers face problems when dealing with the supermarket chains. These chains 
are keen to secure volume. Herring has long been an affordable product with high 
volume and low prices. Customers in Eastern Europe, Germany and Poland have 
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extensive contracts with supermarkets, but when the price increases they have a 
challenge.’ 
These statements reflect a view of herring as a homogeneous resource, where price mechanisms 
are the driving force of the exchange mechanism. 
Another problem reported is the seasonal variation in the herring stock. It is difficult for the 
Norwegian exporters to plan ahead and make long-term agreements. One exporter said: ‘The 
fishing industry is the only industry in the world where access to raw materials varies greatly 
from one day to the other due to quotas and weather.’ This means that there is hectic activity 
at the facilities at times when the herring is landed, but there may also be quiet periods: ‘We 
are working day and night. We started to produce 1 September. When we got to the middle of 
October, the workers had had two days off. We're not talking 6–7 hour working hours, but 12-
hour shifts.’ Several facilities, therefore, receive different fish species which have different 
catch periods. For instance, catch periods for mackerel and herring are different from each other. 
This is a way for the receiving-facilities to utilise their capacity. The natural variety in quotas 
also implies that the actors are forced to treat the herring as a homogeneous resource. 
 
This is further reflected in the way the Norwegian producers process the herring. Production 
activities in Norway are mainly sorting, filleting and freezing of the fish. The industry has 
developed quality and traceability systems; pictures are taken of the products and random 
samples are selected from the different boxes so that customers can have a certain idea about 
the quality. Sometimes customers come to Norway to supervise this process, but quality 
supervision is largely left to the Norwegian producers. Processing beyond sorting, filleting and 
freezing is expensive and impractical because of Norwegian customs barriers; currently a 20% 
customs duty into the EU is added. German customers, therefore, prefer to buy frozen fish and 
add further production value such as marination and preservation. 
It also appears that the Norwegian exporters have little experience with the various ways in 
which the herring is treated. For instance, one respondent signals that the fish is heterogeneous 
in use in the various markets. In Norway on the other hand, the fish is treated as a homogeneous 
resource: ‘We cannot rule out processing in Norway, but this is expensive and we have no 
culture for it. Denmark, Germany and Poland have long traditions and know what the market 
wants,’ one Norwegian respondent claimed. Another said that  
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‘This has been discussed at length. In terms of value added, it is difficult to produce for 
the consumer market in Norway. This is partly due to the cost level in Norway and 
because each export market has its own product preferences and requirements’. 
The handling of the fish also reflects this view of homogeneity. After the fish is sorted and/or 
filleted, it is packaged in 20-kilo cartons and frozen. Fish can be stored at the exporter’s 
production facilities in Norway, but this is expensive. Most of the fish already has buyers, and 
is immediately transported to the customers. The fish is mainly sent by ship to markets in 
Europe and Asia. Hamburg is a major receiving port for the German market, like St. Petersburg 
for the Russian market and Stettin for Poland. Fresh fish is transported via car. Frozen fish is 
shipped on pallets or containers. 
5.1.2 Resource heterogeneity and the German market 
Germany is, in many ways, the most developed market for Norwegian herring, and there many 
actors see herring as a heterogeneous resource. This has partly to do with the traditional German 
food culture. The herring has many applications in Germany. It is marinated, used in salads and 
eaten as traditional matjes. German shops provide a large variety of processed products such as 
herring in brine, herring salads, canned herring and vacuum packed herring. Herring is also sold 
individually by weight, so-called rollmops, in fish shops or deli counters in supermarkets. 
German buyers are either agents/traders or factories that buy directly from Norwegian exporters 
and use herring as input to their production process. The various herring-products are then sold 
to wholesalers and, in some cases, directly to the purchasing departments of large German 
retailers. 
The German producers have relationships with a number of other suppliers of resources used 
in production, such as packaging (tin cans, glass, plastic, paper, etc.) and ingredients (creams 
and sauces). In addition to this are suppliers of logistic services such as transportation and 
storage. A particular feature of the German market is that several producers use subcontracted 
production in Poland, which represents an important input factor. We also find relations to the 
Norwegian Seafood Council, which is a key actor in efforts to promote Norwegian seafood to 
consumers in cooperation with the German producers and retail chains. Several respondents 
mention ties to WWF’s sustainability assurance scheme, the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC) label, as an important relationship. WWF has been an important driving force to get 
German producers to use the MSC standards in their quality system, and several producers have 
included their Norwegian suppliers in these efforts. 
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5.1.3 Conflicting views of fish as a resource 
The German producers have extensive contacts with their domestic customers, and a lot of 
product development is done in close cooperation. This may indicate that German producers 
and their retail customers see the fish as a heterogeneous resource, as they mutually put great 
effort in developing and tailoring unique products. Such relationships are long-term and well 
developed. Norwegian producers are, on the other hand, rarely introduced to German retailers 
and wholesalers. ‘It makes no sense,’ said one respondent. Norwegian suppliers have apparently 
little knowledge of the preferences of the German market, according to one German buyer who 
said, ‘Norwegians don’t know because they don’t eat matjes! But we do.’ 
The Norwegian auction system is the main factor that worries the German producers. The 
system is perceived as rigid and costly, and prevents stability and long-term investments. One 
German producer said 
‘In 2011 and 2012 the herring quotas were very low, and we subsequently had fewer 
raw materials available. But the demand was still there. We had to pay too much to the 
Norwegian suppliers, but our German customers were not willing to pay 
correspondingly. We therefore lost money in 2011 and the first half of 2012. I have 
discussed this many times with Norwegian producers, but they blame the fishermen.’  
From a German perspective, the auction system means that the Norwegian exporters sell their 
fish to the highest bidder in other export markets, even though the fish is in high demand in 
Germany. This makes it difficult for German factories to plan their production, and has an 
additional impact on their relationships with their customers. A German respondent said,  
‘When the catching starts in September/October, the herring is really big. This is the 
right size for the East-European markets, like Russia and Ukraine. The fisherman is 
subsequently focusing on catching the big herring for these markets because they get 
high prices there. And they will continue looking for big herring until this demand is 
met. But this is not what the German market needs. We need smaller sizes. The fishermen 
often know where the small herring is, but they don’t want to catch it because they get 
more money for the big herring. It’s in the interest of the fisherman to go for the big 
sized herring.’ 
Here we see that the view of resource heterogeneity of the German customers’ conflicts with 
the view of homogeneity of the Norwegian supply side. The suppliers appear to be maximising 
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each single transaction, even behaving opportunistically, whereas the German customers have 
a long-term view of their relationships to the suppliers. 
5.1.4 Degrees of relationship commitment 
Nevertheless, we find varying degrees of cooperation and commitment in the relationships 
between Norwegian suppliers and German customers. Large German producers with substantial 
volumes argue that they must rely on deliveries from several Norwegian suppliers. Here the 
relationships are less developed. One respondent explained  
‘I cannot depend on one producer. It's impossible. Things can change. You must 
compare prices and have more places to go... We have made no adaptions to the 
Norwegian suppliers. The producers produce, and we buy. They sell the same type of 
fish to all the other producers. We gain nothing by working more closely. But they know 
what we need.’ 
Still, a certain degree of adaptation is present. Once a year this producer meets with his 
Norwegian suppliers and presents his production plan for the entire season. He estimates the 
qualities and sizes of the herring, and then asks the producers to submit quotes for what they 
think they can deliver. Based on previous knowledge, he then places orders with the suppliers 
who he thinks are best equipped. Thereby, it is the same suppliers who deliver every year. 
Another German customer has made a greater degree of adaptation in his supplier relationships. 
He uses several Norwegian suppliers, and his suppliers have made adjustments in their fillet 
production to meet his quality standards. Nevertheless, this customer relies on balancing his 
suppliers against each other. He said 
‘Our demand is so huge and we can’t buy just from one. Because one supplier doesn’t 
have the quantity and quality we need. We have to balance the market, to use all 
possibilities. The suppliers are more interested in doing business with us then. Price is 
important.’ And his suppliers share this objective. They said, ‘Our contracts are based 
on volume, not price, because that is a risk for both sides. We are interested in getting 
the quantities we need at a reasonable price. And our suppliers are interested in having 
a partner which is able to take huge quantities. So we share the same goals when we 
meet up.’ 
Here we find good examples of production adjustment and closer ties between the Norwegian 
producers and German customers. But this also indicates that production volume is an important 
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factor: customers who buy small volumes, and those who buy very large volumes, have made 
a few adaptions on the resources side. The parties have regular meetings where they enter into 
binding contracts on deliveries, but not on price. These relationships are characterised by trust 
and a generally good atmosphere. There is a low level of conflict – their frustration concerns 
the auction system and, to a lesser extent, the role of the Norwegian exporters. 
We also find examples of close cooperation and commitment. This is to a large extent driven 
by a need for information about fish quality and size. During the catching season in Norway, 
one of the respondents says that he gets information about sizes and qualities from his 
Norwegian supplier and can turn down fish with lower quality. Others do their own inspections. 
One respondent said 
 ‘I was recently at two of the Norwegian factories. I had a look at the whole production 
line. We usually test and taste the quality. This is important. We want to know when the 
fish is caught, how much – how high is fat content, the texture, etc… This is very 
important to us. When send samples to our lab to see whether we have received correct 
product information. We also discuss what we need and when we need it.’ 
Access to information is one of the reasons why one of the companies in our sample has only 
one Norwegian supplier. Previously, this company used different Norwegian suppliers but 
found that product quality varied greatly. To get access to the best quality, they were forced to 
work closely with their Norwegian supplier and share their knowledge of production quality:  
‘Earlier we would ask Norwegian producers for quantities and they would send samples. 
We would check the samples, and if it was OK we would take the lot. But we had 
problems. If you get a delivery of 20, 40 or 60 tons there is a big variation in quality. 
You cannot see this in the sample blocks. This created a lot of problems at our plants 
because we never knew what we had in stock. We then decided to make a trip to Norway 
and look at some producers. We decided which producer should be our partner for the 
future. We then made our specifications and placed orders based on our requirements 
from this single producer. As a consequence we did not have as many production 
problems as before. We did this step by step, from season to season. We had to find out 
what was wrong last season, and what needed to change in the next. We introduced a 
completely new quality system for our company, and gradually this became state of the 
art production technology in Norway.’  
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This is an example how two actors have related their resources to each other. Now they have 
developed a long-term relationship where they share production technology. This technology 
has had positive effects for other relationships. 
This is also an example of how German customers have challenged the view of the Norwegian 
suppliers. The German customers see the fish as a heterogeneous resource, whereas the 
Norwegian exporter sees it as a homogeneous resource. The German customers have had a hard 
time getting their Norwegian supplier to produce herring fillets that are of high enough quality 
for the German market. ‘Norway has a different view of herring than we have in Germany’, 
said one respondent. He further added 
‘The quality and processing of Norwegian herring fillets is not good enough. The 
Norwegian customers don’t look at herring as high quality food. To them herring is just 
another fish. They don't know how we use this food in Germany and what you can do 
with herring. Herring is not just herring – you marinate it, fry it, make salads. It has 
varied use. At first the Norwegian producers didn't know how to produce herring to our 
standard. They tried their best, but when the fish arrived at our plant there were a lot of 
damages that our people had to remove with knives. On several occasions the cut was 
wrong and we could not use the fish. You can make a lot of mistakes when you don’t 
know what the customer needs or how he uses the raw material. When we started 
working closely with our Norwegian supplier we helped them with their production. We 
stayed for several weeks, followed the production day by day and helped the producers 
to adjust the machines and make the right cut.’ 
This knowledge has gradually been adopted so that it is now standard for a number of customer 
relationships: ‘Today all of them have the same cut, and the same quality demands that we 
initiated originally. But we were the first.’ This quality improvement makes it easier to sell fish 
to restaurants and retailers. In this way, it has created value for all actors: 
‘This was of course to avoid costs in our company. Our products are going into 
restaurants and hotels. If you have a nice dinner and order herring, you do not want the 
filet be broken or have big belly flabs. Or a yellow colour which means that it is oxidized. 
It must be very good because you are paying a lot of money for it.’  
This speaks about a very distinct knowledge of how a resource such as herring should be 
developed to provide maximum value to the end customer. 
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5.2 Case analysis of interaction/integration patterns 
The case indicates that there are several patterns observable in the relationships between 
Norwegian suppliers and German customers. The actors’ view on resource homogeneity vs. 
heterogeneity seems to be an important factor in how these relationships are seen and progress. 
We will now look at some important facets of our case in terms of the five different patterns 
identified. 
5.2.1 Pure exchange – no integration 
The auction system in itself is perhaps the best example of this pattern. The system is designed 
based on the view of pure exchange with a market and formally and legally defers integration. 
The actors involved clearly see the fish from a perspective of resource homogeneity. This 
prohibits Norwegian suppliers from interacting in a closer way with the catch side and restricts 
access to the raw materials. Further, it becomes difficult for the Norwegian suppliers to interact 
closer – form relationships – with their German customers as they need to engage in a market 
system to sell their products to the highest bidder. 
 
Several actors on the German market state that they avoid becoming dependent on their 
Norwegian suppliers, and they want to use several suppliers. In these cases dependency is seen 
as a problem. The extent of this attitude varies. One respondent for example said that ‘we have 
to follow the market’ and pointed out that a market solution would give him the best possible 
conditions. Another importer said: ‘We have no adaptations to the Norwegian suppliers. Only 
trade activities, no common projects. We have nothing to gain by becoming more integrated.’ 
Others explain this from a capacity perspective: No single Norwegian supplier is large enough 
to supply all fish that a German producer needs. Closer integration, therefore, becomes 
problematic because it requires that he must develop ties with a supplier that may be incapable 
of meeting his needs in the future. Therefore, the customers need to balance the suppliers against 
each other. 
 
5.2.2 Limited interaction and integration 
We find several examples of limited interaction and integration in the case. 
Adaptations over time: Many German factories produce large volumes and they have to rely 
on deliveries from several Norwegian suppliers. These relationships are characterised by 
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interaction over time resulting in long-term planning and adjustments or common procedures 
to some degree. The companies have cooperated for some time and know what they can expect 
of each other. 
Information access during the catching: The actors’ interactions include information about 
product quality and size during the fishing season in Norway. In this way the customers can 
remove fish of poorer quality. 
Inspections: We find examples where a German importer makes regular inspections at facilities 
in Norway. They discuss production together, but these agreements are not as extensive as the 
examples above. 
Seasonal planning: Several German customers plan their season ahead with their Norwegian 
suppliers. They discuss volumes, qualities and sizes of herring. Based on this, the suppliers 
report what they think they can deliver during the season. Customers then select who gets the 
order based on past experiences. This is an example of limited interaction and integration 
because the cooperation is done in a routine manner, and it is the same companies that deliver 
every season. Hence, both the customers and the suppliers know what they can expect. 
The common denominator here is the resource perspective. In these relationships the fish is 
seen as less heterogeneous, and the German suppliers are wary of becoming too committed to 
one or few Norwegian suppliers. This has partly to do with the fact that the fish is easily 
substituted with fish from other suppliers, and the customers have nothing to gain from 
becoming interdependent. 
5.2.3 Extensive interaction – developed integration 
The interaction between several Norwegian exporters and customers in Germany are extensive, 
leading to developed integration. 
Customised production technology: One of the German producers has chosen to buy from only 
one Norwegian supplier, and his supplier has adapted its production lines to his German 
customer. The parties have, through extensive interaction, developed a close relationship, and 
this was a deliberate strategy by the German customer. After some trial and error, they have 
developed a high quality production process together. Here resource sharing appears in terms 
of product knowledge, market information and mutual learning. The German customer has a 
clear idea of how he wants to utilise the resource for his end users, and the Norwegian 
production technology must be tailored to his requirements in order to secure the resource 
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quality. This development has largely been driven by the customer, as he has a different 
resource perspective compared to his Norwegian supplier. As a result of the interaction process, 
the Norwegian supplier has opened up to new perspectives, and the production technology 
subsequently has become an industry standard, benefitting several connected relationships. 
Another German respondent points to similar adaptations. This company uses a number of 
Norwegian suppliers, but the suppliers have made adjustments to their fillet production to meet 
German quality requirements. We also find examples of this pattern where one of the German 
producers gets his supplies from only one Norwegian supplier and one German agent. Here we 
are talking about relatively small volumes where the producer does not need to rely on multiple 
suppliers. 
Information exchange during catch season: Extensive information exchange is another good 
example of developed integration. The German customers need information about fish quality 
and size, and together with their suppliers, they have developed systems for taking production 
samples and tracking shipments on regular intervals. 
Logistics and storage: Our case shows how transportation and storage are handled in a number 
of ways in the interaction. This has to do with how the production structure is created at one 
end, and how the fish is sold and consumed at the other end. The fish is caught and consumed 
at different seasons, and this creates the possibility for extensive activity-links across the 
network. Frozen fish can be stored for a period of time without loss of quality. Cost-effective 
storage can also help mitigate the problems created by seasonality and capture variations. 
However, large storage facilities bind capital, and there must be agreement between the actors 
how this cost should be distributed. In the case study, we find many examples of how different 
actors have managed to do. One way might be to develop solutions beneficial for all the parties 
involved, such as shared storage capacity. Other actors try to find more specific solutions better 
tailored to their relationships.  
‘Customers have different ways in which they want the goods delivered. Some want to 
have the fish right away; others want a longer delivery schedule. It varies from customer 
to customer. They approach us and we must then tell our processing facilities how the 
customer wants the fish delivered. For example, we discuss which production lines we 
should run: Should we make adjustments for higher priced products, or be run more 
standard production for the lower priced ones? But customers are very conscious of 
what they want’ (Norwegian exporter). 
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5.2.4 Indirect interaction – structural integration 
In this case there are a several good examples of this pattern. 
The auction system and herring quotas: The relationship that exporters have with the catch 
side is perhaps the best example of the indirect interaction relationship between Norwegian 
exporters and their export customers. The auction system in Norway increases prices and this 
can lead to opportunistic behaviour among the exporters. At the same time, reduced herring 
quotas have an impact on the volume available for export. 
 
New production technology: Production adjustments between German customers and their 
Norwegian suppliers, which have gradually become standard production technology, is a very 
good example of structural integration. Here technological developments in the interaction with 
one customer have effects on connected relationships. 
 
MSC certification: Another good example of structural integration is where NGOs exert 
pressure on the German producers to demand MSC certified herring from Norwegian exporters 
related to their interaction with suppliers. Norwegian herring is traditionally regarded as being 
of a higher quality compared to herring from Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Additionally, it is 
harvested in a sustainable manner due to strict Norwegian quota regulations. German producers 
are therefore interested in developing more extensive certification schemes with their 
Norwegian suppliers. 
 
Substitution of herring by other export countries: Even though Norwegian herring is 
considered to be of high quality, the ties between Norwegian exporters and German customers 
are affected by changes in demand for herring from other countries. Due to its geographical 
proximity, Danish herring is available as fresh whereas Norwegian herring is only available as 
frozen. Volumes from Denmark are nevertheless low due to limited production capacity and a 
restructuring of the industry toward fewer actors. 
Substitution of herring by other product categories: Several respondents mentioned the threat 
of herring substitutes. Producers will reduce the herring content in their products and increase 
ingredients such as sauces, spices, vegetables if Norwegian herring continues to be sold at high 
prices. One respondent said that chicken and soy products would take over the market share for 
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herring in much the same way. This type of indirect interaction and structural integration will 
create changes in demand which will affect all herring producers. 
Storage and transport: We find examples of indirect interactions in cases where the actors use 
joint storage and transport facilities on sea and land in order to utilise spare capacity. We also 
find shared short-term storage with agents in Germany and Holland. 
 
Hired production in Poland: Two of the German companies in our study have subsidiaries in 
Poland which produce for the German market, and this is an increasing trend. Such indirect 
interactions affect relationships between Norwegian exporters and German customers. 
 
Cooperation with the Norwegian Seafood Council: Several of the German actors have 
extensive cooperation with the Norwegian Seafood Council concerning sales promotion and 
advertising campaigns. The Norwegian Seafood Council has a good overview of the German 
market and helps Norwegian exporters with practical organisation of their marketing activities 
in cooperation with German producers and retailers. Here multiple relationships are affected 
because market knowledge and consumer insight created in one relationship becomes available 
to all the connected actors. 
5.2.5 Full integration 
Interestingly, we don’t find much evidence of this type of integration in the case. The closest 
example we have, is one of a Norwegian supplier which has been in discussion with his German 
customer about a possible takeover. They are, however, reluctant to make such a move. The 
main argument is that it is difficult to have a good relationship with other customers in Germany 
if you become an importer because you also become their competitor. Currently the suppliers 
are dependent on several customers, and the customers are dependent on several suppliers. Full 
integration is believed to create problems that far outweighing the benefits. 
On the other hand, we find examples of full integration in some of the connected relationships. 
For instance, several of the largest German producers own processing facilities in Poland. The 
main reason here is economies of scale such as reduced labour costs. We also find examples 
where German producers have factories is Poland to be closer to the Polish market, the main 
reason here being market entry considerations. But in the case of the herring in Germany, 
Norwegian exporters and German importers have yet to make the move. 
This analysis may be summed up in the following Table. 
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Table 3: Summary of different interaction and integration patterns. 
 
 
1. Pure exchange – no 
integration 
 
2. Limited interaction 
and integration 
 
3. Extensive interaction 
– developed integration 
 
 
4. Indirect interaction –
structural integration 
 
5. Full integration 
• Norwegian auction 
system promotes 
pure exchange and 
defers integration 
• Many actors want 
more suppliers to 
deal with 
• Dependence is 
seen as problematic 
• Few links between 
Norwegian 
suppliers and 
German retailers 
• Long-term and 
routine adaptations 
over time 
• Information sharing 
during the catch 
season 
• Inspections at 
supplier plants 
• Seasonal planning 
between several 
actors 
 
• Examples of 
customised 
production lines 
based on customer 
needs 
• Logistics 
• Information 
exchange 
 
• The auction system 
and herring quotas 
has great influence 
• New production 
technology has 
become new 
industry standard 
• MSC certification 
important for 
retailers 
• Substitution of 
herring by other 
export countries 
• Substitution of 
herring by other 
product categories 
• Storage and 
transport 
• Hired production in 
Poland 
• Cooperation with 
the Norwegian 
Seafood Council 
 
• No examples in the 
ties between 
Norwegian 
suppliers and 
German customers 
• Examples in 
connected 
relationships: 
• Ownership between 
German producers 
and Polish 
 
Resource view 
    
 
• Homogeneity 
 
 
• Partial 
heterogeneity 
 
• Heterogeneity 
 
• Heterogeneity 
 
• Homogeneity and 
heterogeneity 
6 Discussion and conclusion 
Our findings suggest that there is a link between how actors perceive herring as a resource, how 
they interact and the subsequent integration. This follows our initial statement that resource 
heterogeneity is the basis for interaction. In our case, we find that actors who see the fish as a 
homogeneous resource limit interaction to pure exchange and have none or limited integration, 
whereas actors with a more heterogeneous view of the resource have a more extensive 
interaction and usually end up in a closer type of integration. This also suggests that the degree 
of interaction is shaped by a common understanding or shared frame of references between the 
actors, resembling research on network pictures (Abrahamsen et al., 2012; Ford and Redwood, 
2005; Mouzas et al., 2008), idea structures (Abrahamsen et al., 2011; Håkansson and 
Waluszewski, 2002), or network theories (Johanson and Mattsson, 1992). Our study finds that 
the differences in perceptions, not only of the network structure but the value put on the resource 
itself, determine the extent of interaction and integration. Actors with a homogeneous view of 
the resource limit the value of the resource to a question of price, whereas actors with a 
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heterogeneous view see the value of the resource depending on how it is combined with other 
resources. 
On the one hand, the Norwegian auction system is organised from a market perspective based 
on pure exchange. Actors who benefits from this system, such as the catch side and the 
representatives from the auction house, see this system as the best way to create efficiency. 
However, the actors in connected relationships, such as the German producers and German 
retailers, are dependent on well-developed interaction with their suppliers. Efficiency, in their 
mind, is access to raw materials suitable for a diverse product range, and to them herring is 
clearly a heterogeneous resource. These two perspectives ‘clash’ in the case of the Norwegian 
exporters and their network position. On the one side, the exporters have to buy the resources 
from a homogeneous market system, and on the other side they have to sell the resource to a 
heterogeneous network. However, the perspective the exporters take, to a large degree, reflects 
the catch side of the network where resources are seen as homogeneous. For instance, the 
German producers and retailers state that the Norwegian suppliers are little concerned with the 
various uses of this valuable resource in the consumer market. As one respondent so clearly 
described it: Herring is not just herring! However, it is not just a case of changing one’s 
perspective in order to create space for extensive interaction. Representing an industry structure 
characterised by overcapacity and heavy investments, the actors revert to a short-term, 
transaction-based perspective where the ultimate objective is to sell the resources available at 
any time, and to the highest bidder. Accordingly, the structure itself promotes no integration or 
limited integration patterns. Thereby, one may question whether our previous argument should 
be reversed: Is it the actor’s view of the resource as homogeneous which leads to limited 
interaction and integration, or does the auction system force the actors to treat the fish as a 
homogeneous resource? 
In the case where there is a greater presence of extensive interaction and developed integration 
patterns, these activities are driven by actors with a more heterogeneous resource view. And it 
is to a large extent customer driven. It is the German customers’ perspective of the fish as a 
heterogeneous resource which, in a number of cases, has led to the development of closer ties 
and cooperation between Norwegian suppliers and their customers. Obviously, to cater to the 
demands of the German retailers and their wide range of herring products, the German 
customers need to develop ties and invest in relationships with suppliers that can tailor their 
production to the customers’ needs. As such, heterogeneity creates a strong basis for extensive 
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interaction. Good examples here are adaptation of production technology (sharing tangible 
resources) and extensive information exchange (sharing intangible resource). 
Concerning product development, Norwegian production technology has been adapted by 
several exporters to specific customer needs in Germany. One of the exporters said:  
‘Many of our customers have very specific requirements. In all our factories, we have 
detailed specifications that we have to take into account. Our customer may have several 
end-customers. In these cases our products are adapted for each customer. For instance, 
we make different cuts for each customer. These customers have been very open with us. 
For our largest customer, we have made production specifications and processes in 
order to adapt to their needs. We also have niche customers who are even more specific. 
But this is a difficult market to operate in, and not anyone can do it.’  
This trend is driven by large retail chains focused on creating cost-effective workflows. 
Information and communication are also important interaction means in developing closer 
integration. Good information is essential for effective customer and supplier relationships. 
This is particularly important in situations where there is a natural variation in herring 
availability. In this particular industry, we find both seasonal variations and variations in the 
volume and quality of each catch. This means that there sometimes is very intensive 
communication between the actors, while at other times there is less activity. In our case, 
Norwegian suppliers meet their European customers in person at regular intervals, usually three 
to four times a year, and often at trade shows and other customer events. The contact is more 
frequent via email and telephone, sometimes daily in busy periods. Large customers send their 
own inspectors to Norway at regular intervals. Smaller customers send agents or wholesalers. 
Information about product quality is a key factor determining the extent of integration. From 
our case, it is apparent that the actors have found several ways to handle the flow of information. 
German importers and producers have, for instance, joined forces with their Norwegian 
suppliers to develop an MSC certification scheme for herring, in addition to regular visits at 
their Norwegian suppliers’ production facilities. The MSC label represents an important quality 
indicator. This flow of information also makes it easier for retail chains to track production 
quality. This is important because it represents a key part of marketing to consumers. 
Our study also highlights the role of resource heterogeneity in indirect interactions, referred to 
as structural integration. At the start of the paper, we argued that from an economic point of 
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view a homogeneous resource has the same value independent of the other resources it is 
combined with. But from a heterogeneous perspective, the value of a resource is directly 
affected by how it is combined with other resources. The MSC certification is a good example 
here. Norwegian herring becomes more valuable when it is combined with new industry 
standards from NGOs and requirements from German retailers. Here, herring as a resource is 
combined with other resources such as information and knowledge. In total, this increases the 
value of the Norwegian herring to the actors. Similar examples may be found in the relationship 
between Norwegian and German industrial actors and the Norwegian Seafood Council. This 
actor provides a similar resource in terms of knowledge about the German market. We have 
also seen many examples where the herring is combined with a range of other resources such 
as sauces, brines, packaging, etc. as a consequence of the wide range of products found in the 
German supermarkets. 
We also find examples where German actors process Norwegian herring in Poland. Here, the 
herring is combined with production capacity resources and new production technologies. A 
similar case is where production technology in Norway has become the new industry standard. 
Here, the resources developed in one relationship have spill-over effects on connected 
relationships with benefits for the entire industry. 
Conversely, if the actors are unable to combine the herring with the other resources available, 
there is little space for integration. For instance, some respondents argue that the high price of 
herring will eventually shift demand to substitutes like chicken and soy products, suggesting 
that resources that are difficult to access (in this case due to high prices) will be substituted with 
other resources that better fit with the existing resource structure. 
Interestingly, we do not find many examples of full integration in the study. One reason may 
be the found in the industrial structure where the auction system favours opportunism and short 
term exchange. The other explanation is, of course, the Norwegian legislation. But there is 
nothing preventing the actors from integrating with the customer side in the network. Few of 
the actors are, nevertheless, willing to do this. 
Comparing the pelagic network with other similar networks, there are some interesting 
similarities and differences. In seafood networks such as Norwegian salmon in Japan, white 
fish in England and bacalao in Portugal, there has been a considerable shift towards closer 
integration between the actors recent years (Abrahamsen and Håkansson, 2011; Cantillon and 
Håkansson, 2007; Cantillon et al., 2006; Haugnes, 2010). A similarity in all these cases is the 
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increased importance of retail chains, calling for new ways to combine important resources 
across the network. 
Current trends, such as overcapacity at the catch side in Norway, industry concentration and 
the production level, and increasing retail concentration in Europe, suggest that the industry 
may increasingly be dominated by a small number of large actors in the coming years. There is 
also beginning a concentration amongst Norwegian fishing vessel owners. An auction system, 
with only a small number of actors left, will then be of little significance. Rather, the industry 
will develop towards a network of large actors with close ties. In such a system, the prerequisite 
for interaction is resource heterogeneity. The supply of herring will, nevertheless, be dependent 
upon seasonal variations and quotas which favours short-term exchange events. As this paper 
has highlighted, the ability to interact and integrate will subsequently depend on how the actors 
view their available resources. At the same time, the interaction reflects the logic of the system 
in which it takes place. 
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Appendix A: Interview guide 
 
General information about the company: 
Brief history of the company 
Market share 
Competitive conditions 
Products 
About the company’s relationships: 
What does your network look like? 
Which suppliers do you buy from? 
Which customers are you selling to? 
What other actors do you have relationships with? 
How long have these relationships existed? 
What do you buy? How much? How often? 
How are the relationships organised? Who does what? 
Have you made special adaptations for your customers and suppliers? 
What activities do you perform with your suppliers? Are these activities linked to 
relationships with your customers? 
What resources have you developed together? How are these resources linked with the 
resources of other actors? 
How is the climate of cooperation? (Cooperation and conflict, mutual adaptation, trust, 
power and dependency, formal or informal tone?) 
How will these relationships evolve in the future? How will your network look in five years? 
In what areas can Norwegian suppliers create value for its customers in your market? 
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